Битва за Мидуэй: различия между версиями

В соответствии с японской доктриной того времени, командующий авианосной группой [[Нагумо, Тюити|адмирал Нагумо]] держал половину своих самолётов в резерве на случай отражения атаки авианосцев противника. Всего было 36 пикирующих бомбардировщиков с «Хирю» и «Сорю», 36 торпедоносцев с «Кага» и «Акаги» и 36 истребителей, снова по 9 с каждого авианосца. Соответственно цели, резервные самолёты были вооружены торпедами. После отражения первого налёта американцев Нагумо решил, что опасность атаки миновала, и приказал перевооружить резерв бомбами для повторной атаки Мидуэя.

 

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Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear Admiral [[Tamon Yamaguchi]], leading Carrier Division 2 (''Hiryū'' and ''Sōryū''), recommended Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand: 18 Vals aboard each of ''Sōryū'' and ''Hiryū'', and half the ready CAP aircraft.<ref>Bicheno, Hugh. ''Midway'', p.134.</ref> Nagumo’s seeming opportunity to hit the American ships,<ref>Parshall & Tully, ''Shattered Sword'', pp.165-170.</ref> however, was not limited by the fact his Midway strike force would be returning shortly and needing to land promptly or ditch (as is commonly believed).<ref>Fuchida and Okumiya, ''Midway''; Willmott, ''Barrier & the Javelin''.</ref> Because of the constant flight deck activity associated with combat air patrol operations during the preceding hour, the Japanese never had an opportunity to spot their reserve for launch. The few aircraft on the Japanese flight decks at the time of the attack were either CAP fighters, or (in the case of ''Sōryū'') fighters being spotted to augment the CAP.<ref name=autogenerated1>Parshall & Tully, ''Shattered Sword'', p. 231, derived from ''Senshi Sōshō'', pp. 372—378.</ref> Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would require at least 30-45 minutes.<ref>Parshall & Tully, ''Shattered Sword'', pp.121-124.</ref> Furthermore, by spotting and launching immediately, Nagumo would be committing some of his reserve to battle without proper anti-ship armament; they had just witnessed how easily unescorted American bombers were shot down by their own fighters.<ref>Prange, ''Miracle at Midway,'' p.233.</ref> (In the event, poor discipline saw many of the Japanese bombers ditch their bombs and attempt to dogfight interceptor F4Fs.)<ref>Bicheno, p.163.</ref> Japanese carrier doctrine preferred fully constituted strikes, and in the absence of a confirmation (until 08:20) of whether the American force contained carriers, Nagumo’s reaction was doctrinaire.<ref>Prange, ''Miracle at Midway,'' pp.217-218 & 372—373; Parshall & Tully, ''Shattered Sword'', pp.170-173.</ref> In addition, the arrival of another American air strike at 07:53 gave weight to the need to attack the island again. In the end, Nagumo chose to wait for his first strike force to land, then launch the reserve force, which would have by then been properly armed and ready.<ref>Prange, ''Miracle at Midway'', pp.231-237; Parshall & Tully, ''Shattered Sword'', pp.170-173; Willmott, ''Barrier & the Javelin''; Fuchida & Okumiya, ''Midway''.</ref> In the final analysis, it made no difference; Fletcher had launched beginning at 07:00, so the aircraft which would deliver the crushing blow were already on their way. There was nothing Nagumo could do about it. This was the fatal flaw of Yamamoto’s dispositions: it followed strictly traditional battleship doctrine.<ref>Willmott, ''Barrier & the Javelin''; Fuchida & Okumiya, ''Midway''.</ref>